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The World Economy 
Although inflationary pressures have begun to 
build up strongly during 1990, the rate of 
consumer price increases fell slightly during the 
year to May in both the G7 countries (4.3%) and 
the OECD as a whole (5.9%). The price surge which 
was so noticeable in Japan in the latter part of 
1989 and early this year subsided considerably 
during March and April, although there is now some 
evidence of a re-emergence of this problem (see 
Japan below). In fact, in the year to May 
consumer price inflation moderated in six of the 
seven G7 countries - the exception, which will 
surprise no-one, was the UK. 
Consumer price inflation in the year to May was as 
follows: Canada 4.5%; US 4.4%; Japan 2.5% (year to 
April); France 3.0%; West Germany 2.3%; Italy 
5.7%; UK 9.7%. 
MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS 
The early part of 1990 saw continued slowing of 
economic growth in the major industrialised 
countries. GDP growth in the top seven 
industrialised nations (the G7) was just 0.5% in 
the first quarter, the same as the final quarter 
of 1989. For the year to March G7 GDP growth 
slowed to 2.4% compared with 3.3% for calendar 
year 1989. The most rapid slowdown occurred in 
the US where 3.0% growth in 1989 fell to 2.1% in 
the year to March. Overall G7 growth would have 
been considerably lower had it not been for 
increases in the growth rates of West Germany 
(4.3%) and Japan (5.5%). Growth rates for the 
remaining G7 countries (excluding Italy) were as 
follows: Canada 2.2%; France 2.5%; UK 1.8%. 
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Industrial production also continued to slow 
steadily during the first quarter of this year. 
For the OECD as a whole industrial production rose 
by just 2.0% in the year to March, down from 
1989's rise of 2.6%. As has been the case for 
some time, the G7 countries have led the slowdown, 
and G7 industrial production growth in the year to 
April was a mere 1%. Two of the seven largest 
countries had declines in industrial production 
during this period; Canada (-2.2%) and, rather 
surprisingly, France (-0.3%). The remaining 
countries performed as follows: US 1.3%; Japan 
3.4%; West Germany 2.1%; Italy 1.8%; UK 0.5%. 
Labour Market 
The steady falls in unemployment which were 
evident during 1989 have now clearly levelled off. 
Average OECD unemployment in April was 6.0%, 
unchanged from January. The G7 countries fared 
slightly better with an unemployment rate of 5.5%, 
also unchanged from January. Within individual G7 
countries there were few changes in the rate of 
unemployment between February and May. 
Unemployment rates (in May unless otherwise 
stated) were as follows: Canada 7.6%; US 5.3%; 
Japan 2.1% (April); France 9.3%; West Germany 5.1% 
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(April); Italy 10.2% (April); UK 6.2% 
United States 
During the past four months there has been a 
barrage of conflicting statistical evidence on the 
performance of the US economy, with opinion 
divided on whether inflation or recession is the 
greater threat. An example of this is the monthly 
index of the National Association of Purchasing 
Managers, a survey-based index indicating the 
strength of the (mainly manufacturing) industrial 
sector of the economy. The index rose steadily 
between April and June, indicating a stronger 
manufacturing sector, and was backed up by a 2.1% 
increase in manufacturing new orders in May. The 
NAPM's index then promptly slumped in July, once 
again raising fears in some quarters of recession, 
fears which were strengthened by the Gulf crisis 
and higher oil prices in August. 
Partly as a result of this type of contradictory 
evidence the Bush administration and the Federal 
Reserve have differed somewhat over monetary 
policy. The administration has been keen to see an 
early cut in interest rates, arguing that the 
Federal Reserve is overly cautious with respect to 
inflation while being too sanguine on the 
possibility of recession. The Reserve, on the 
other hand, has consistently taken the view that 
there is little real prospect of recession, 
forecasting real GNP growth of 1.5-2.0% this year 
albeit with a very sluggish second half-growth. 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has been 
consistent in the view that a cut in interest 
rates will be forthcoming, but only when the 
administration and Congress agree a package to 
reduce the budget deficit, of which agreement 
there is little sign at the time of writing. 
At first sight the Federal Reserve's caution on 
inflation appears justified; consumer prices rose 
0.5% in June, giving an annual rate of increase of 
5.9% compared with 4.5% for calendar year 1989. 
The administration takes the view that this will 
rapidly stabilise around the 5.5% mark before 
falling in 1991, and is concerned that interest 
rate reductions take place in order to offset 
likely cuts in government spending and higher 
taxes introduced to help reduce the budget 
deficit. 
Probably correctly, the administration takes a 
fairly relaxed view about the effect higher oil 
prices will have on the US economy, trimming 
growth a little and adding less than one 
percentage point to the rate of inflation, unless 
the Gulf crisis worsens substantially. Although 
domestic demand is shaky, export growth remains 
fairly strong - an increase of over 8% in the 
first five months of 1990 compared with the same 
period last year. The main problem for the US may 
stem from a crisis not in the Gulf but one of 
confidence in the domestic economy. 
Japan 
At first sight Japan is the industrialised economy 
which has most to lose from higher oil prices and 
prolonged uncertainty in the Gulf. Japan is 
dependent on imports for 99% of its oil, and 
further inflationary and potentially recessionary 
pressure from this source would appear to be very 
unwelcome for a country which recently underwent a 
'triple fall' - declines in the yen, share prices 
and bond prices. However, in recent years the 
Japanese economy has proved to be remarkably 
resilient to even quite severe exogenous shocks, 
and this is likely to be the case once again. 
The last Commentary mentioned the rapid 
depreciation of the yen and recent turmoil in 
Japanese financial markets, sufficient, perhaps, 
to end Japan's remarkable recent record of 
economic growth. In the last three months, 
however, the economy has recovered to such an 
extent that it was as if the 'crisis' had never 
occurred, and forecasts of GNP growth are once 
again being adjusted upwards. In the first 
quarter of 1990 real GNP grew by 2.5% over the 
previous quarter, an annual rate of over 10%. By 
June the Japanese economy had achieved its 44th 
consecutive month of growth, a feat which has not 
been accomplished even in Japan since the 1960s. 
Industrial production also remains very buoyant, 
and GNP growth of between 4% and 5% is now being 
forecast both officially and unofficially. 
The recovery in the value of the yen, coupled with 
a further rise in the official discount rate to 
6%, will help the fight against inflation which 
has begun to emerge as a serious threat in Japan -
although at less than 3% consumer price inflation 
looks low by recent UK standards. Nevertheless, 
very low unemployment (2.1%) and emerging labour 
shortages are now putting upward pressure on 
wages. 
But what of the effect of higher oil prices? 
Despite Japan's dependence on imports, oil is now 
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much less important than it was in the 1970s. 
According to one recent estimate, in 1974 a rise 
of 10% in the price of oil meant a 1.0 percentage 
point rise in inflation and a 0.5 percentage point 
reduction in economic growth; the equivalent 
figures today are nearer 0.1 percentage point on 
inflation and a reduction in economic growth of 
0.1 percentage point. Even if oil prices were to 
stick in the $30 pb range this would imply a 
degree of difficulty for Japan, but very far from 
a catastrophe. 
But just as it appears that Japan can cope with 
the threat of higher oil prices an older problem 
ones again moves into view. After falling 
steadily for some time, Japan's trade surplus 
widened substantially in June to $6.7 billion. 
Despite official statements about this being the 
effect of the recent weakness of the yen and 
unexpected single items of exports, there does 
appear to be some concern that this may signal the 
beginning of larger Japanese trade surpluses with 
all the friction with the US and other Western 
countries which that has entailed in the past. As 
before, this may be the price which has to be paid 
for Japan being one of the principal G7 growth 
economies. 
Germany 
With German unification now scheduled for 3 
October it seems appropriate to drop the prefix 
'West' from this section. Unfortunately, the 
problems inherent in combining two very different 
economies are not so easily dealt with, and it is 
on these problems that this section concentrates. 
Although the legal and constitutional niceties of 
a united Germany must wait for October, 
unification occurred in practice on 2 July with 
monetary union. Almost immediately, both East and 
West began to experience the pains of rapid 
economic adjustment, with most of the difficulties 
being experienced in the East. One of the 
problems here is that hard data on the East German 
economy is very scarce, but it does now seem to be 
the case that the situation was much worse than 
had been thought; already some East Germans are 
accusing the West of failing to provide the 
necessary capital to prevent a complete collapse 
of East German industry, and of being too eager to 
pick up the profitable parts on the cheap. 
East Germany's 8,000 state-controlled companies -
which account for nearly all of the country's 
industry - have now been placed in the hands of a 
'treuhand' (trust) whose job it is to oversee 
their successful transition into the private 
sector. The trust guaranteed the first tranche of 
liquidity credits (valued at DM10 billion) to 
these companies in July, in the hope that West 
German banks would follow close behind with their 
own money. In fact this has been slow to occur, 
with banks tending to insist on 100% guarantees 
from the trust. Chancellor Kohl was forced to 
make a personal appeal to West German bankers to 
be less cautious in their lending policies. 
Even if the necessary finance for speedy 
restructuring can be forthcoming rapidly, it is 
far from clear how much of East German industry 
can survive in the free market. Pessimists take 
the view that little over half of these 
enterprises will survive, with East German 
unemployment rising to 4 million; even optimists 
expect unemployment to rise above 1 million, out 
of a total workforce of less than 9 million. 
Already unemployment is rising more quickly than 
was expected by Bonn, because of the rapid 
collapse of the East's industry. In July alone 
unemployment doubled to 280,000, and seems likely 
to be double the estimate of 450,000 for the 
second half of the year on which budget estimates 
were made. Partly for this reason East Germany's 
budget deficit is expected to be 30% above the 
forecast level of DM32 billion, and financing this 
deficit must ultimately fall at the door of West 
Germany. 
Germany should, however, be able to take even 
these problems in its stride. Shortly before that 
plans for early constitutional merger were 
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announced, the Bonn Government forecast 3.5% 
growth for West Germany in 1991, with almost one-
third of this coming from demand stimulus from the 
East. While both East and West will continue to 
grumble about opportunism on one one side and 
economic incompetence on the other, the united 
Germany should weather the short-term storms 
successfully and continue to be one of the main 
driving forces for growth in the G7. 
PROGNOSIS 
Until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August 
it seemed that the major industrialised countries 
were, in the main, continuing their steady path 
towards economic slowdown without entering 
recession. Financial storms had been weathered in 
Japan, and while the transition to a market 
economy in East Germany is proving to be more 
costly than was anticipated, the evidence still 
suggested that this could be dealt with in a 
reasonably orderly fashion. Admittedly there was 
still a threat of recession in both the US and UK, 
but on balance the overall picture still looked 
bright until the end of July. 
Whether the situation in the Gulf changes all this 
very much depends on whether there are outright 
hostilities and what effect there is on the price 
of oil. Much, but by no means all, of the 
shortfall in Iraqi/Kuwaiti production can be made 
up by oil producers from both inside and outside 
OPEC. Nevertheless, there will inevitably be 
higher oil prices and a degree of pain attached to 
them; but unless the situation in the Gulf worsens 
considerably this need not be too severe. 
Economies like Japan and West Germany, although 
heavily dependent on imports of oil, are growing 
sufficiently quickly to be able to weather an oil 
price in the $25-30 pb range without too much 
difficulty, although at the risk of some 
inflationary pressure. The US may, however, be at 
much greater risk. As was indicated in the United 
States section above, there is already a crisis of 
confidence with regard to the American economy 
which will not be helped by rising oil prices. 
Unlike most other industrialised countries, the US 
has done relatively little to reduce its 
dependence on oil following the price hikes of 
1973 and 1979, and this may make it more 
vulnerable to problems in the Gulf than many other 
countries. 
Even allowing for possible US difficulties, the 
likely outcome for industrialised countries in the 
West is some discomfort but not disaster, unless 
the position in the Gulf worsens markedly. It is 
worth bearing in mind that in real terms oil 
halved in price between mid-1980 and mid-1990, and 
we have some way to go before we experience the 
dislocations of 1979-80. 
7 
